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Activating Actavis
B Y A A R O N E D L I N , S C O T T H E M P H I L L , H E R B E R T H O V E N K A M P, A N D C A R L S H A P I R O

I

N FTC V. ACTAVIS, INC., 1 THE SUPREME
Court provided fundamental guidance about how
courts should handle antitrust challenges to reversepayment patent settlements. The Court came down
strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove
more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit
believed.” 2 At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower
courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust
litigation.” 3
This article is an effort to help courts and counsel fill in
the gaps. We identify and operationalize the essential features
of the Court’s analysis. We describe the elements of a plaintiff’s affirmative case, justifications that are ruled out by the
Court’s logic, and a test for viable justifications. For private
cases, we outline an appropriate procedure for evaluating
damages and suggest specific jury instructions.

The Essence of Actavis: Inferring Harm to
Competition
The Court describes the basic reverse-payment situation this
way:
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The
two companies settle under terms that require (1) Company
B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the patented product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) Company A, the
patentee, to pay B many millions of dollars. Because the settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged infringer,
rather than the other way around, this kind of settlement
agreement is often called a “reverse payment” settlement
agreement. And the basic question here is whether such an
agreement can sometimes unreasonably diminish competition in violation of the antitrust laws.4
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As we shall explain, the Court answered with a resounding yes. Reverse payments can violate the antitrust laws and
they do so when they are payments to delay competition, or
otherwise to limit the risk of competition. We call such payments “payments for delay.”
Future cases are likely to involve variations on the basic
reverse-payment fact pattern, which has two essential elements: (1) a large payment, in some form, from the patentee
to the alleged infringer, and (2) a requirement that the alleged
infringer refrain from competing, for some period of time and
in some respects, using the patented technology. The Court’s
formulation is not limited to settlements between rival drug
makers, and future cases could involve settlements in other
industries.
The Key Source of Inference: A Large Reverse Payment.
The essence of the Court’s opinion is that “the size of the
unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness” and that a large reverse payment
creates an inference that the settlement is anticompetitive.5
The Court considers a settlement anticompetitive if it reduces
the extent or likelihood of competition, even by a small
amount:
The owner of a particularly valuable patent might contend,
of course, that even a small risk of invalidity justifies a large
payment. But, be that as it may, the payment (if otherwise
unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition.
And, as we have said, that consequence constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm.6

Our Appendix presents a simple model showing that sound
economic reasoning underlies the Court’s inference of competitive harm from a large reverse payment.7 Whenever the
reverse payment exceeds the patent holder’s prospective litigation costs plus the value to the patent holder of any other
goods and services provided by the allegedly infringing firm,
the model indicates that the settlement diminishes the expected period of competition and harms consumers. Such settlements are aptly called payments for delay and are anticompetitive under the Court’s rule of reason. The expected
litigation outcome is not the only relevant benchmark. A
reverse payment also amounts to a payment for delay if the
parties would have settled for an earlier entry date in the butfor world where such large reverse payments were banned.
Absolute Patent Weakness Is Neither Inferred Nor
Needed. A large reverse payment does not necessarily mean
the patent is weak in any absolute sense. As Chief Justice

Roberts’s dissent points out, a patent holder might “pay a
good deal of money to rid itself of [a] 5% chance of a finding of invalidity.” 8 The model in the Appendix provides a rigorous basis for this assertion by relating the patent holder’s
payment to an upper bound on patent strength. The upper
bound on patent strength that is consistent with the reverse
payment can be quite large.
However, the possibility that the patent has a high chance
of being found valid and infringed does not undermine the
logic or validity of the Court’s approach. The Court is quite
explicit on this point, as shown by the quotation above. A settlement can reduce competition even if it eliminates only a
“small risk of invalidity” (or, presumably, non-infringement),
and thereby eliminates the associated “risk of competition.” 9
This happens if the agreed period of competition is smaller
than what could be expected from the (in this case small)
probability of the patentee losing the patent litigation.
Crucially, this is exactly what one can reasonably infer whenever the net reverse payment exceeds the patentee’s avoided
litigation expense. More specifically, what can be inferred is
not that the patent is weak in any absolute sense, but rather
that it is sufficiently weak that the settlement reduces competition in expectation, thereby depriving consumers of some
of the benefits from competition. For that reason, as the
Court emphasized, preventing even a small risk of competition “constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm.” 10
A Consumer Welfare Test. The Court adopts a consumer welfare approach to antitrust in contrast to a total
welfare approach that would also consider producer profits.
The basic problem arises, in the Court’s view, when a firm
“maintain[s] and . . . share[s] patent-generated monopoly
profits,” 11 because, when this happens, “the consumer
loses.” 12 This consumer loss is the cognizable harm, as the
Court makes clear, without inquiry into what part of the loss
takes the form of deadweight loss, or instead is transferred to
producers as extra profit.
For purchasers of patented drugs, the consumer loss from
delayed competitive entry is large. When generic entry
occurs, the price drops, often dramatically. To take just one
example, a blockbuster cholesterol drug dropped from more
than $150 for a month’s supply to $7, less than a year after
generic entry.13 An industry-commissioned study estimated
total savings of nearly $1 trillion from generic competition
over the past decade.14
The Court appears to be unanimous in adopting the consumer welfare approach. The dissent writes: “The point of
antitrust law is to encourage competitive markets to promote consumer welfare.” 15 The dissent’s core position is that
the case should be decided as a matter of patent policy rather
than antitrust law; nowhere does the dissent urge the inclusion of producer profits as an offset to consumer harm.
The use of consumer welfare as the relevant measure is
unsurprising. The Supreme Court, and the courts more generally, virtually never approve horizontal arrangements found
to create a market-wide output reduction and higher prices

simply because they believe that producer surplus is large
enough to compensate for any consumer losses. Rather, they
insist that there be no consumer loss at all.16
The Plaintiff’s Case:
Establishing Payment for Delay
Just what must an antitrust plaintiff establish under the structured and circumscribed rule-of-reason approach called for by
the Court?
“Rule-of-Reason” vs. “Quick-Look” Approach. The
Court rejected the FTC’s “quick-look” approach under
which “reverse payment settlement agreements are presumptively unlawful.” 17 However, the Court also made clear
that a “long form” rule of reason was not necessary, and in
particular that both anticompetitive effect and market power
could be inferred from large reverse payments themselves.
The Supreme Court in general and Justice Breyer in particular have never embraced a “quick-look” analysis in which
all presumptions favor the plaintiff. Rather they have twice
observed that there is a “sliding scale” for appraising reasonableness, in which the nature of the proof varies with the circumstances.18 The Actavis decision is consistent with that
approach. In particular, the Court held that “a court, by
examining the size of the payment, may well be able to assess
its likely anticompetitive effects along with its potential justifications without litigating the validity of the patent.” 19
The patentee is willing to pay an amount up to litigation
costs to get as much protection from competition as it expects
to get from litigation. If the patentee is offered valuable services by the claimed infringer as part of the settlement, it may
be willing to pay for the value of those services, in addition
to any savings in litigation costs. Payment beyond this threshold, however, looks suspiciously like payment to avoid more
competition than would be expected from the outcome of the
patent case. Therefore, proving that a payment is above the
threshold creates an inference that the settlement is anticompetitive. Unless there is another explanation for the payment, that inference should stand.
Under the Court’s focused rule-of-reason inquiry, no separate showing of market power is necessary. Economically,
this is appropriate. Market power is but a proxy to identify
when anticompetitive effects are plausible. As the Court
points out, market power may likewise be inferred from payment size, and without any need to define a relevant market.20
A producer in a highly competitive market would not pay
anything to keep a rival out because price-cost margins are
already low and keeping one firm out would not improve that
situation. In contrast, a firm with market power typically will
enjoy high margins, and protecting those margins by excluding rivals can be very valuable. Following this logic, a large
reverse payment indicates that market power exists, just as it
indicates that the settlement is anticompetitive.
Plaintiff’s Affirmative Case. From the above, we see
that the plaintiff’s case involves a narrowly focused inquiry.
The plaintiff must establish (1) that the claimed infringer has
F A L L
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agreed to abstain, in some respect, from competing using the
patented technology for a period, and (2) that there was an
otherwise unexplained payment from the patent holder to the
claimed infringer.
The payment prong involves the following steps: (a) valuing any consideration flowing from the patentee to the
claimed infringer, which may be made over time and may
take forms other than cash; (b) deducting from that payment
the patent holder’s avoided litigation costs; and (c) deducting from that payment the value of goods, services, or other
consideration provided by the claimed infringer to the patent
holder as part of the same transaction (or linked transactions).21 The resulting net payment is “otherwise unexplained” and, if it is a positive quantity, may be understood
to be payment for delaying entry. Where the payment takes
a form other than a simple cash transfer from the patentee to
the claimed infringer, consideration should be valued from
the perspective of the patentee.22
Payment from the patent holder to the claimed infringer
can take many forms. Valuing this consideration, step (a)
above, is sometimes an intricate proposition. For example, the
payment could include forgiving a debt owed by the claimed
infringer to the patent holder. The debt may include patent
infringement damages. The claimed damages could pertain
to the product whose infringing entry is at issue (if there has
been entry)23 or another product. The consideration could
also involve a “sweetheart” deal on goods purchased from the
patentee.24 The payment could also take the form of a patentee agreeing to abstain from vigorous competition once the
claimed infringer enters the market, where such abstention
lowers the patentee’s profits and increases the alleged
infringer’s profits.25 For example, in the pharmaceutical context, the patentee may agree not to market its own unbranded generic.26 Although sometimes intricate, handling this
complexity is well within the competence of a district court.
Valuing the consideration flowing from the claimed infringer to the patent holder, step (c) above, also may be intricate. In the particular context of pharmaceuticals, most
reverse payment cases arise in the context of payments that
are described by defendants as consideration for value furnished by the generic firm. In the Actavis case, for example,
defendants argue that the payments were in exchange for
promotion and backup manufacturing services by the generic drug maker, rather than for delay.27 In other cases, defendants have argued that the alleged infringer provided valuable
intellectual property licenses to the patentee.28
The Actavis Court gives district courts extensive discretion
to develop a procedure to collect and appraise this evidence
within the rule of reason.29 In particular, the trial court is free
to “create and revise presumptions of varying strengths to
arrive at sensible decisions in the face of the many uncertainties of business reality.” 30
Here is how we recommend making appropriate use of
that discretion. In its prima facie case, the plaintiff must
show a restriction on competition by the alleged infringer and
1 8
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a large payment by the patentee. To show that a payment is
large, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing steps (a) and
(b), including the value of any non-cash consideration provided by the patentee, and that the payment is larger than the
patentee’s avoided litigation expense. The defendants have
the burden of production as to step (c), proving that the
payment was for valuable services, rather than delay.
Such a shift in the burden is a common feature of rule-ofreason cases, and it is particularly appropriate here.31 After all,
the defendants are in possession of the relevant evidence
about their side deals. Moreover, the complexity is the result
of the defendants’ own actions. The elephant in the room
here merits naming. The parties to a payment for delay have
ample reason to pack complexities into the deal (such as relatively unimportant services) to conceal its genuine nature.
Ordinarily, a genuinely valuable fee-for-service deal could be
kept separate from the settlement to avoid antitrust problems.
A degree of skepticism is therefore warranted with regard to
complex reverse-payment settlements where the parties justify the large payments by subsidiary consideration. Plus, if
this skepticism causes future parties to unbundle these settlements into separate deals, we doubt much will be lost to
parties who are genuinely not paying for delay. Furthermore,
the valuable-services argument is made weaker, at least in the
pharmaceutical context, by the fact that brand-name firms
apparently seek out these services from generic firms only in
the context of settlement.32
In the end, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the fact finder that the patent holder made some payment for delay. This involves more than just establishing the
existence of a reverse payment, because, as discussed above,
reverse payments can be part of procompetitive settlements,
rather than payments for delay.
Explanations and Justifications
The defendants will presumably attempt to demonstrate that
any payment can be explained as payment for services or
avoided litigation costs and so is not a payment for delay. If
the defendants prevail on this point, the plaintiff’s case fails.
The Court leaves the door open to other “justifications”
for a reverse payment, but is skeptical, and does not explicitly identify any. Justice Breyer’s opinion merely says: “There
may be other justifications” besides avoided litigation costs
and services provided by the generic.33 However, this statement clearly seems directed at explaining the reverse payment
as something other than payment for delay, not at justifying
a payment for delay. The Court later says: “An antitrust
defendant may show in the antitrust proceeding that legitimate justifications are present, thereby explaining the presence of the challenged term and showing the lawfulness of
that term under the rule of reason.” 34 But notice again that
the inquiry is focused on “explaining the presence of the
challenged term,” i.e., the otherwise unexplained payment.
Ultimately, then, any explanation must show that there
was no payment for delay. As in National Society of Profes-

sional Engineers v. United States,35 a payment for reduced
competition cannot be defended by arguing that the absence
of competition is justified; rather the defendants must show
that competition is actually enhanced, or at least not delayed
by the settlement.
Below, we discuss three justifications of a settlement that
defendants are likely to offer but that are precluded by the
logic of the Court’s opinion. We then propose a simple test
that viable justifications should meet to be consistent with the
opinion.
Patent Strength. Prior to Actavis, courts frequently struggled with the question of what role, if any, evidence of patent
strength plays in the analysis of an alleged payment for delay.
The purpose of such an analysis, as the Supreme Court
explained, is “to demonstrate what would have happened to
competition in the absence of the settlement.” 36 For example,
a defendant might present evidence that the patent was valid
and infringed. That evidence might take the form of detailed
technical evidence showing that the patent was nonobvious,
or that the alleged infringer proposed to make a product
within the claims of the patent. Or it might take the form of
internal analyses by the patentee or infringer expressing a candid view of the strength of the patent.
Such evidence might be thought valuable by providing a
baseline for identifying the expected amount of competition
absent the settlement, which could then in principle be compared to the terms of the settlement. If the patentee were sufficiently likely to have won the patent case, then (a defendant
might argue) a settlement with a particular entry date provides as much competition as the expected outcome of patent
litigation.37 Such a patent-strength approach contrasts with
the payment approach advanced by the Actavis Court.
The Court makes clear that litigating the patent is not necessary for the affirmative antitrust case. However, can the
defendants offer to prove that the patent was very likely valid
and infringed as a defense, as the dissent suggests? The Court
never flatly states that patent strength has no place in the
determination of antitrust liability. However, we think that
the Court’s statement that it is “normally not necessary to litigate patent validity,” 38 and other statements to like effect, are
best taken at face value. The dissent states that the majority’s
claim cannot be so “unless [the Court] means to suggest that
the defendant (patent holder) cannot raise his patent as a
defense in an antitrust suit.” 39 We think the Court must
mean exactly that. Otherwise, such a defense would invariably be raised and it would normally be necessary to litigate
patent validity and infringement, directly contrary to the
Court’s repeated assertions. Allowing such a defense would
defeat the Court’s stated purpose of cutting to the chase in
these cases.
The appellate court in Actavis refused to litigate patent
strength because the conclusions from such a patent minitrial inside an antitrust case would be unreliable and require
“attempt[ing] to decide how some other court in some other
case at some other time was likely to have resolved some

other claim if it had been pursued to judgment.” 40 The
appellate court considered an inquiry into the merits of the
patent suit to be a “turducken” approach, comparing it to a
dish in which a boneless chicken is stuffed inside a boneless
duck, and in turn into a turkey. The Actavis Court picked up
on this concern about a turducken patent trial within an
antitrust trial as an event that would “prove time consuming, complex, and expensive,” and likely “not be worth that
litigation candle.” 41
The entire Supreme Court appears to agree that a patent
mini-trial inside an antitrust case should be avoided.42 Plus,
even if the antitrust court could reliably find that the patent
case was strong, this finding would have limited utility in
assessing liability. After all, as Chief Justice Roberts points out
and the model in the Appendix confirms, a large payment
may be made to eliminate a small probability of losing litigation. Yet that is enough for an antitrust violation, as the
Court’s opinion makes clear.
We read Actavis to disallow patent mini-trials, but even if
we are wrong, the Court’s opinion certainly disfavors it. At
the very least, a trial court has ample license to limit evidence
on the validity and scope of the patent and to only hear evidence to the extent that it is highly probative in establishing
whether there was payment for delay, not simply to establish
that the original patent case was strong.
Patent Law and Policy. The Court rejected a set of arguments, offered by the defendants and emphasized by the dissent, that are rooted in the language of the Patent Act and
considerations of patent policy. They do not enjoy a second
life as purported justifications for payment-for-delay settlements.
Defendants may not offer justifications based on the Patent
Act that reject the basic structure of the Court’s analysis. They
may not assert that the patent confers insulation from antitrust
scrutiny by its very existence. Such an approach is questionbegging, and the Court rejected it.43 Comparing the consumer benefits from delayed entry with entry at patent expiration—essentially arguing that the settlement is a blessing,
compared to the worst case—is similarly off the table.44
As for patent policy, the Court notes at several points that
its analysis is an accommodation of antitrust and patent principles.45 However, these statements do not open the way to
creative defenses rooted in patent policy. After all, an important “patent-related policy” is to “eliminat[e] unwarranted
patent grants so the public will not ‘continually be required
to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justification.’” 46 The context in which the Court makes these
points is in seeking—and failing to find—any provision in
which “‘the patent statute specifically gives a right’ to restrain
competition in the manner challenged.” 47
Defendants may not argue that an otherwise anticompetitive settlement can be justified on the ground that the higher patentee profits are actually beneficial because they encourage or fund further innovation. Nor may they offer the
related defense that delayed entry provides the needed incenF A L L
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tive for the patentee to develop an even better product. These
kinds of arguments have already been considered, and rejected, en route to developing the Court’s particular accommodation between antitrust and patent law. Indeed, this sort of
argument was part of the fundamental approach of the dissent, which favored an exception to antitrust law premised on
the presence of a patent, to encourage innovation.48 The dissent lost on this point. Thus settlements must be evaluated
based on the competition lost due to the horizontal restraint,
without an offset for allegedly increased innovation due to the
settlement.
Risk Aversion. Defendants may try to argue that the patentee is highly risk-averse and agreed to relatively early entry
as a result. A sufficiently risk-averse patentee might in principle pay the defendant an amount in excess of avoided litigation costs and also agree to an entry so early that consumers enjoy more competition under the settlement than
would be expected from litigation. The patentee would do so
to avoid the risk of facing even more competition if the
patent litigation went south. Put differently, risk aversion
could disturb the inference from the large settlement payment that the settlement entails less competition than litigation, because sufficient risk aversion can justify large payments to avoid small risks.
The Court says that payments to avoid even a small risk of
competition are antitrust violations.49 That is reason enough
to deny a risk-aversion defense. The Court also points out
that, without the reverse payment, the parties might have
reached a settlement with an earlier entry date, to compensate
the claimed infringer for the lost payment.50 Compared to this
benchmark, the payment for delay harms consumers and
hence constitutes an antitrust violation, whether or not the
patentee is risk-averse.51 These arguments suggest rejecting the
risk-aversion argument. If a trial court is nevertheless inclined
to consider such an argument, we recommend that any claim
of risk aversion be subject to a demanding standard of verifiability akin to what courts require for efficiencies in mergers.
Viable Defenses. The Court left open the possibility for
other defenses that justify the reverse payment. However, the
Court expressed some skepticism about what these justifications might be. We cannot predict what other defenses will be
offered, but we encourage courts to restrict their attention to
arguments that involve showing that the challenged settlement will lead to a longer period of competition, or stronger
competition, than should be expected from either litigation
or from an alternative settlement without the payment.
Private Actions
Liability Standard. The Actavis case was brought by the
Federal Trade Commission under Section 5 of the FTC Act.
However, the FTC often applies Sherman Act standards in
such cases, and nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion suggests that the Court was applying a broader liability rule
available only to the FTC under Section 5 of the FTC Act.
This was, for all intents and purposes, a Sherman Act case.
2 0
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Thus, the inference and procedure described above are also
available to private plaintiffs.
Causation and Damages. The difference between private
actions and government enforcement actions is that the private plaintiff must show injury, causation, and must quantify any damages. As discussed above, the patent holder’s motive
for making a payment for delay is to prevent the price erosion
that would have resulted from entry. If the plaintiff is a purchaser, then injury and causation requirements will be met by
a showing that there was such a payment for delay and that it
did, in fact, delay the price erosion. Individual plaintiffs will
then prove damages by showing the time period during which
competition was reduced by the settlement, the magnitude of
price erosion caused by entry, and the extent of their purchases
during the damages period.52
Pharmaceuticals are commonly sold through various intermediaries, thus making end users indirect purchasers. These
purchasers would ordinarily be denied a damages action
under federal law, but often they can obtain damages under
a state antitrust indirect purchaser provision. Under federal
law, however, even indirect purchasers may be able to obtain
an injunction against enforcement of a pay-for-delay agreement found to be anticompetitive.53
Like most price-fixing cases, these cases should be readily
amenable to class action treatment when the plaintiffs are
direct purchasers. The purchasers could be end users, but they
could also be distributors, pharmaceutical chains or stores,
health plans, government agencies, or any other entity that
purchases directly from the pioneer.
One interesting question is whether the settling claimed
infringer is equally liable for damages along with the settling
patent holder. We see no reason for deviating from the usual
rule that all participants in a cartel or market division agreement can be held liable, and also from the ordinary rules of
joint and several liability making each accountable separately or together. These are not cases in which the claimed
infringer is coerced to enter a conspiracy. Rather, the claimed
infringer enters the unlawful arrangement in contemplation
of a higher payoff.
Model Jury Instructions. In private cases, we suggest
that the jury be asked whether there is a payment for delay,
i.e., a payment not accounted for by avoided litigation costs
and other services provided by the claimed infringer to the
patent holder. This is the key finding of fact required to
determine whether the challenged settlement is anticompetitive. As noted above, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on this issue.
We propose the following jury instructions on the specific issue of whether a patent settlement involves payment for
delay.54
A settlement of patent litigation violates Section 1 of the
Sherman Act if it harms competition. Competitive harm
may be inferred if one party has agreed in the settlement
that for a period of time it will not compete with the patent

holder in certain respects (such as using the patented technology) and if that party has received an unreasonably
large payment from the patent holder.
In assessing whether this payment is unreasonably large,
you may consider whether the payment is no greater than
the patent holder’s anticipated litigation costs that are
avoided through settlement. You may also consider whether
the challenged agreement represents no more than reasonable compensation, based on market values, for services
that the claimed infringer has agreed to render to the patent
holder. You may also consider the defendants’ argument
that no part of the payment was made to delay competition
or to avoid the risk of competition. If you find that the payment is unreasonably large, then you must find that it produces competitive harm.
You may not consider the validity of the patent as a defense.
Nor may you consider as a defense that the term of the
agreement fell within the remaining term of the patent—
i.e., that the agreement did not last beyond the expiration
date of the patent.
If a trial court decides to include a market power instruction, separate from a finding of competitive harm, this
instruction should explain that market power can be inferred
from a large payment just as competitive harm can be.55
Conclusion
The Court has provided a well-marked roadmap by which
courts can evaluate patent settlements involving reverse payments. The Court’s rule-of-reason approach acknowledges
that not all reverse payments are anticompetitive: some payments represent avoided litigation expenses; some are fair
compensation for valuable services rendered by the alleged
infringer; and some may have other legitimate justifications,
though the Court wonders skeptically what those might be.
Having said that, the Court makes clear that payments made
to delay competition or to avoid the risk of competition (in
the event that the patentee loses the patent litigation) violate
the antitrust laws. They do so even if the claimed infringer
has only agreed to abstain from competition during a portion
of the patent period.
The essence of the Court’s opinion is that whenever the
reverse payment is otherwise unexplained, a fact finder can
infer that the patentee has paid for delay and hence that the
settlement is anticompetitive. Here, with the assistance of a
model of reverse-payment settlements, we clarify what payments are sufficiently large to justify the inference that a settlement is anticompetitive.
In the wake of Actavis, the job of a fact finder is to conduct
a focused inquiry to determine whether the reverse payment
can be explained by the patent holder’s avoided litigation
costs and other consideration flowing from the alleged
infringer to the patent holder. Importantly, our model justifies what the Court clarifies and emphasizes: direct evidence

of the strength of the patent at issue is not necessary to make
this inference. The focus of the inquiry carries over to possible explanations and justifications. These must show that
the challenged settlement leads to earlier or more competition
than would a settlement without the reverse payment. Other
defenses should be rejected. 䡵
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F ORDHAM L. R EV. 2471, 2476–77 (2013).

17

Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237; see also Reply Brief for Petitioner at 7–8, FTC
v. Actavis (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 1099171.

18

Id. at 2237–38 (quoting California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780
(1999), which was in turn quoting 7 P HILLIP E. A REEDA , A NTITRUST L AW : A N
A NALYSIS OF A NTITRUST P RINCIPLES AND T HEIR A PPLICATION ¶ 1500, at 1507
(1986)).

19

The Court delineates the relevant considerations in examining the size of
the reverse payment as follows:
[T]he likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive
effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other services for
which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing justification. The existence and degree of any anticompetitive consequence
may also vary as among industries. These complexities lead us to conclude that the FTC must prove its case as in other rule-of-reason cases.

Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
20

See id. at 2236 (“[T]he size of the payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective generic is itself a strong indicator of power . . . .”)
(internal quotation omitted).

21

An agreed entry date prior to patent expiration is not a form of consideration under steps (a) or (c).
F A L L

2 0 1 3

·

2 1

C O V E R

22

This analysis applies in cases in which the source of the benefit to the
claimed infringer is something costly to the patentee. We do not address
situations, such as the “bottleneck” that arises in some reverse-payment
cases, in which the benefit to the claimed infringer is achieved at little or
no cost to the patentee.

23

There are no such damages in cases where the settlement precedes entry
by the claimed infringer.

24

For a further analysis of various forms of compensation, see C. Scott
Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 C OLUM . L. R EV. 629, 663–66,
682–85 (2009).

Appendix
The Impact of Reverse-Payment
Settlements on Competition
The patent holder is Firm A. The potential entrant is Firm B.
The remaining patent lifetime is T. For simplicity, assume no
time discounting. The patent holder places a probability P on
winning the patent litigation, i.e., that the patent will be
found valid and infringed. For this base case, the patent
holder is assumed to be risk-neutral. Significant risk aversion
would alter these results.
Monopoly profits for Firm A are MA. Duopoly profits for
Firm A are DA. Consumer surplus is higher under duopoly,
SD , than under monopoly, SM . All profits and consumer surplus are per unit of time. The two firms can settle or litigate.
A settlement involves two parameters: the entry date E for
the potential entrant and a reverse payment X from the patent
holder to the potential entrant. The patent holder’s litigation
costs are CA.
Firm A’s payoff from settling on terms [E,T ] is
EMA + (T – E)DA – X. Firm A’s expected payoff from litigating is T [PMA + (1 – P)DA ] – CA. If we observe a settlement, we may reasonably infer that it was better for Firm A
than litigating, so we can infer that
EMA + (T – E)DA – X > T [PMA + (1 – P)DA ] – CA .
Simplifying, this can be written as
E > PT +

X – CA .
MA – DA

Here PT is the expected amount of time when the market
will be monopolized by the patent owner if the patent is litigated. In the absence of any reverse payment or litigation
costs, X = CA = 0, this inequality becomes E > PT.
This inequality allows an assessment of patent strength,
although as explained below, no assessment of patent strength
is necessary to determine whether consumers were harmed by
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Such an arrangement can also be directly analyzed as an illegal non-compete agreement, in which the patentee agrees to pull its competitive punches in exchange for the claimed infringer delaying entry.

26

Hemphill, supra note 24, at 684.

27

Second Amended Complaint at 29–32, FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 09955 (N.D. Ga. May 28, 2009).

28

See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at 15, FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 082141 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2009) (noting a variety of “side-term inducements,”
including licenses to intellectual property, supply agreements, and co-development deals). For a detailed review of these and other side deals, see

the settlement. For example, if the settlement allowed the
potential entrant to enter after 80 percent of the remaining
patent lifetime, we could infer that the patent holder estimated patent strength as no greater than 80 percent. Reverse
payments push down the upper bound on patent strength.
Note that reverse payments and litigation costs are best measured in proportion to the extra profits that the patent holder stands to gain from keeping out the potential entrant,
MA – DA.
How do consumers fare under the settlement compared
with litigation? Under the settlement, consumer surplus is
ESM + (T – E)SD. Under litigation, expected consumer surplus is T(PSM + (1 – P)SD ). Consumers are worse off under
the settlement if and only if
T (PSM + (1 – P )SD ) > ESM + (T – E)SD.
Simplifying, and using SM < SD, this can be written as
E > PT.
We consider the settlement anticompetitive if it leads to
more monopoly and less duopoly, thereby harming consumers, compared to litigation. This is the standard used in
Shapiro (2003).* Under this standard, the settlement is anticompetitive if E > PT. This is precisely the inference we can
make, using the previous inequality, if (but only if ) X > CA,
i.e., if (but only if ) the reverse payment exceeds the patent holder’s avoided litigation costs. We do not need to know the
absolute level of patent strength to reach this conclusion.
Finally, the model provides insight regarding the extent of
competition lost due to the settlement. The expected period
of competition lost due to the settlement is equal to the difference between the expected period of competition under
patent litigation and the period of competition provided for
under the settlement. A lower bound on this quantity is
(X – CA ) /(MA – DA ). This is an important input into the calculation of damages in private cases, because it places a lower
bound on the duration of any overcharge. 䡲

* Shapiro,

supra note 7. See also Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Analysis of Patent
Settlements Between Rivals, A NTITRUST , Summer 2003, at 70–77.

Hemphill, supra note 24, at 663–65 (2009); Kenneth Glazer & Jenée
Desmond-Harris, Reverse Payments: Hard Cases Even Under Good Law,
A NTITRUST, Spring 2010, at 14.
29

See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2233, at 2237–38 (“‘[T]here is always something
of a sliding scale in appraising reasonableness,’ and as such ‘the quality
of proof required should vary with the circumstances.’”); id. at 2238 (exhorting trial courts to “structure” the litigation appropriately).

30

7 P HILLIP E. A REEDA & H ERBERT H OVENKAMP, A NTITRUST L AW ¶ 1508c, at
p. 509 (2d ed. 2010), cited with approval in Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238.

31

The district court has discretion to go further, and assign the burden of persuasion as to step (c) to the defendants. See id. (“We might also transfer
the usual burden of persuasion from the plaintiff to the defendant on some
or all issues”); see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 113 (1984) (assigning to the defendant, under the rule of reason,
the “heavy burden of establishing an affirmative defense” of justification).

32

Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 24, at 666–68.

33

Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.

34

Id.

35

435 U.S. 679, 693–95 (1978).

36

Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234.

37

A variation on this theme is that a patentee with a strong enough patent
should have a special exemption from antitrust, i.e., that there is no need
to evaluate the settlement provided that the patent is probably valid and
infringed. This approach was squarely rejected by the Court’s “risk-of-competition” approach discussed above.

38

Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. The qualifier “normally” refers to the unusual
case in which an antitrust plaintiff alleges that the patent litigation is a
sham, and hence the merits of the patent must be evaluated in detail. Id.

39

Id. at 2244 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

40

FTC v. Watson Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d on
other grounds, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).

41

Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234 (opinion of the Court).

42

Compare id. with id. at 2243 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting bad results
if “immediately after settling, the parties would have to litigate the same
issue—the question of patent validity—as part of a defense against an
antitrust suit”).

43

Id. at 2230–31 (opinion of the Court) (“[T]o refer, as the Circuit referred, simply to what the holder of a valid patent could do does not by itself answer
the antitrust question.”); id. at 2231–32 (“Whether a particular restraint lies
‘beyond the limits of the patent monopoly’ is a conclusion that flows from
that analysis and not, as THE CHIEF JUSTICE suggests, its starting point.”).

44

See id. at 2234–35 (noting and explicitly rejecting that approach).

45

See id. at 2231 (“It would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by
measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against patent law
policy, rather than by measuring them against procompetitive antitrust policies as well.”); id. (noting with approval that previous cases used “traditional
antitrust factors such as likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues,
market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations present in the
circumstances, such as here those related to patents.” ); id. at 2233 (“finding challenged terms and conditions unlawful unless patent law policy offsets the antitrust law policy strongly favoring competition”).

46

Id. at 2233 (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969)).

47

Id. at 2231 (quoting United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 311
(1948)); see also 2233 (criticizing dissent because it did “not identify any
patent statute that it understands to grant such a right to a patentee,
whether expressly or by fair implication”).

48

Id. at 2238 (Robert, C.J., dissenting) (“The point of patent law is to grant
limited monopolies as a way of encouraging innovation. Thus, a patent
grants ‘the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention.’
In doing so it provides an exception to antitrust law, and the scope of the
patent—i.e., the rights conferred by the patent—forms the zone within
which the patent holder may operate without facing antitrust liability.”).
See also id. at 2247 (criticizing Court on ground that its ruling “weakens the
protections afforded to innovators by patents”).

49

Id. at 2236 (opinion of the Court).

50

Id. at 2237 (“[The parties] may, as in other industries, settle in other ways,
for example, by allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee’s
market prior to the patent’s expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point.”).

51

It is possible, of course, that without a large reverse payment the defendants would have litigated their patent dispute, and with a highly risk-averse
patentee this litigation conceivably could have made consumers worse off
in expectation. We discount this possibility because the overwhelming
majority of all patent litigation settles; the main question is on what terms.

52

In cases where generic entry has actually taken place prior to the antitrust
trial, the real-world experience following generic entry is likely highly probative regarding the “but-for” prices and thus regarding damages. The size of
the payment may provide helpful information regarding the length of the
damages period: dividing the payment by an estimate of the annual difference between the patentee’s profits without and with entry provides a
lower-bound measure of the expected number of years by which the settlement delayed competition, or would have absent a subsequent antitrust
challenge.

53

See 2A P HILLIP E. A REEDA & H ERBERT H OVENKAMP, A NTITRUST L AW ¶ 346d
(4th ed. 2013).

54

We envision these instructions being used along with a more general set of
antitrust jury instructions.

55

Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236 (“At least, ‘the size of the payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective generic is itself a strong indicator of
power’—namely, the power to charge prices higher than the competitive
level.”).
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